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Offenders with antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) are widely assumed
to reject psychotherapeutic intervention. Some commentators, therefore,
argue that those with the disorder are better managed in the criminal jus-
tice system, where, following the introduction of indeterminate sentences,
engagement with psychological treatment is coercively linked to the
achievement of parole. By comparison, National Institute of Clinical Excel-
lence guidelines on the management and treatment of ASPD recommend
that those who are treatment seeking should be considered for admission to
specialist psychiatric hospitals. The rationale is that prison-based interven-
tions are underresourced, and the treatment of ASPD is underprioritised.
The justiﬁcation is that offenders with ASPD can be rehabilitated, if they
are motivated. One problem, however, is that little is known about why
offenders with ASPD seek treatment or what effect subsequent treatment
has on their self-understanding. The aim of this paper is to address these
unresolved issues. It draws on the ﬁndings of Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC) funded qualitative study examining the experi-
ences of sentenced male offenders admitted to a specialist personality dis-
order ward within the medium secure estate and the medical practitioners
who treat them. The data are analysed with reference to Michel Foucault’s
work on governmentality and strategy in power relations. Two arguments
are advanced: ﬁrst, offenders with ASPD are motivated by legal coercive
pressures to implement a variety of Foucauldian-type strategies to give the
false impression of treatment progress. Second, and related, treatment does
not result in changes in self-understanding in the resistive client with
ASPD. This presupposes that, in respect of this group at least, Foucault
was mistaken in his claim that resistive behaviours merely mask the
effectiveness of treatment norms over time. Nevertheless, the paper con-
cludes that specialist treatment in the hospital setting can effect changes in
the resistive offender’s self-understanding, but not if the completion of
treatment results, as is commonplace, in his prison readmission.
Keywords: antisocial personality disorder; treatment; Mental Health
Act 1983; Indeterminate Sentence for Public Protection; parole;
governmentality
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Introduction
Thirty years after the American Psychiatric Association ﬁrst introduced us to
antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), the prognosis remains uncertain. Many
medical practitioners assert that the diagnosis constitutes an unfounded basis
for medical intervention. The usual justiﬁcation is that antisocial personality
disorder is a chimera: an aberrant personality is not an illness, and so, cannot
offer itself to a cure in the ordinary way. Other commentators argue that in
light of its positive correlation with imprisonment (Fazel & Danesh, 2000; Sin-
gleton, Meltzer, & Gatward, 1998), ASPD is better ‘managed in the criminal
justice system’ (reported in Duggan & Kane, 2010). Some even contend that
the label of ASPD may encourage the adoption of an ‘invalid role’, which is
incongruous with our wish to see offenders take responsibility for their behav-
iour (National Institute of Clinical Excellence [NICE], 2010). Whilst this latter
application of labelling theory might be a step too far for most, it is impossible
to deny that those with the disorder suffer from complex problems, including
signiﬁcant psychiatric comorbidity (Ministry of Justice, 2011; NICE, 2010).
Pursuant to this reality, treatment regimes for offenders with ASPD are
located within and alongside the criminal justice system, and so, cater for both
sentenced offenders and those transferred to hospital at trial or during impris-
onment (sections 37 and 47 of the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983, respec-
tively). At the time of writing, the coalition government appears committed to
increasing the capacity of prison-based treatment facilities for the most proliﬁc
and dangerous offenders with ASPD (Department of Health/Ministry of Justice,
2011). For the ‘risky’ majority, however, criminal justice policy is often ambig-
uous about the best way to reduce reoffending. On the one hand, following the
introduction of the Indeterminate Sentence for Public Protection (IPP) under
the Criminal Justice Act 2003, dangerous offenders with ASPD, sentenced
after April 2005, are expected to have engaged in psychological treatment
programmes aimed at reducing criminogenic risk factors prior to achieving
parole. On the other hand, the ostensible aim of treatment–rehabilitation is
hampered by insufﬁcient resources resulting from overzealous use of the IPP
(Ministry of Justice, 2010). Whilst a new extended determinate sentence is set
to replace the IPP from April 2013 (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders 2012, section 124), it will not act retrospectively. Currently, 6020
offenders are subject to the IPP, of whom 59% have passed their earliest date
of release (Ministry of Justice, 2012). For this group, the result is offender
incapacitation; the effect is the exacerbation of learned helplessness and dis-
tress associated with imprisonment; the habitual treatment response is to
administer high dose psychiatric medication (Sainsbury Centre for Mental
Health, 2008). Not only is there no ﬁrm evidence in support of this practice
(Khalifa et al., 2011), it cannot be overstated that if you deny offenders the
chance to be responsible, ‘you cannot blame them for behaving irresponsibly’
(Pryor, 2001, p. 4).
The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 49
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The NICE guidelines on the management, treatment and prevention of
ASPD attempt to counter these paradoxes. Recognising the importance of
offender responsibilisation, and, in particular, the poorly met treatment needs
of offenders in prison, it recommends:
Where antisocial personality disorder is suspected and the person is seeking help,
consider offering a referral to an appropriate forensic mental health service … [F]
or problems directly relating to the personality disorder it may be to a specialist
personality disorder or forensic service. (2010, p. 65, emphasis supplied)
Previous research highlights widespread refusal among forensic psychiatrists to
admit offenders with ASPD who are not seeking treatment to forensic mental
health services (Grounds et al., 2004). The operating assumption in these cases
is that treatment-seeking behaviour is strong evidence of motivation to engage.
Others counter that, even if the offender initially presents as motivated, his
desire for power, status and inﬂuence means that treatment is rarely tolerated
for long. However, in 2008, the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC) (as
it then was) surprisingly reported that 85% of sentenced offenders with
personality disorder admitted to hospital were treatment compliant. A number
of plausible explanations for this counterintuitive result were proposed:
Prison transferees may have a longer than average period of hospitalisation, and
long-term detainees are likely to form a group of comparatively ‘well’ and
insightful patients in the forensic system who may be more likely to be compliant
with their continued treatment.
Transferees subject to restriction orders (who are even more likely to be consent-
ing than the group as a whole) may be returned to prison if hospital treatment is
deemed to be no longer necessary, or effective, in their case. Such patients may
comply with their treatment regimes to avoid such an outcome.
Patients with experience of serving prison sentences, especially if they have expe-
rience or knowledge of the parole system, may equate treatment compliance with
the ‘good behaviour’ that leads to quicker release from custodial sentences or
step-down from the higher security levels of the prison system, and (in most
cases quite correctly) therefore view treatment compliance as likely to hasten
their transfer to lower security hospitals and/or release into the community.
The ﬁrst of these explanations implies that continued cooperation is the effect
of long-term psychiatric treatment. The tacit assumption is that psychiatric
treatment imposes normative constraints on the offender, which eventually pro-
vokes in him greater pro-social behaviour. Most importantly, the resistive
behaviours common to offenders with ASPD are not seen to undermine this
process.
The second and third explanations relate to behaviours undertaken by the
offender in pursuit of ulterior gain. For example, the offender may have been
sentenced to an IPP prior to his admission, and may (rightly) perceive that
50 L. McRae
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cooperation with treatment will reduce the chances of his readmission to
prison, where resources are scarce, and where, by necessity, the chances of his
parole are reduced. In this example, we would assume that although it is
possible treatment will rehabilitate him, he has no intrinsic desire to adopt an
alternative form of self-understanding.
General anecdotal support for the latter explanations comes from Len
Bowers’ informative study of nurses’ attitudes towards offenders with ASPD
in their care (2002). He reveals widespread scepticism among nurses that treat-
ment has the potential to rehabilitate offenders who are engaging with it for
subversive reasons. For instance:
But what you’ve got to watch here with [personality disordered] patients, is they
can be manipulative, and they can say that they’re doing, they’re getting better,
and they can conform to all the treatments they’re having and they’re not, they’re
only doing it for their own beneﬁt. To get out of this place. And when they’ve
been discharged, they’ve re–offended. (p. 40)
In one alarming study, 41% of 1353 offenders with ASPD released from high
secure settings went on to reoffend within two years (Coid et al., 2010). And,
whilst this bland ﬁgure cannot tell us whether treatment engagement was the
result of legal coercive pressures (the second and third explanations above), it
does not indicate that offenders are motivated to become more pro-social or
that treatment norms are capable of rehabilitating offenders by overcoming
resistance (the ﬁrst explanation). The NICE guidelines appropriately warn:
It is very unlikely that all antisocial patients can be coerced into pro-social think-
ing or behaviour. This raises important issues of balance between the rights of
individuals to have liberty restrained or treatment imposed against the rights of a
community to be protected from potential harm. (2010, p. 34)
The important question of the correct ‘balance’ to be struck between offenders’
rights and public protection is clearly beyond the scope of this paper; however,
a cogent (and ethical) response will derive from what is shown of the potential
to rehabilitate those in question. The overarching aim of this paper is to con-
tribute to this knowledge store by examining the ﬁndings of an Economic and
Social Research Council-funded empirical study looking at the reasons for
treatment-seeking behaviour in offenders with ASPD, and the effects of hospi-
tal treatment on them.
Methodology
Locative context and working method
The study was conducted on a specialist personality disorder ward in a
medium-secure psychiatric hospital. The aims of the study were twofold: ﬁrst,
The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 51
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to examine why offenders with ASPD might cooperate with treatment, and,
second, to identify the therapeutic beneﬁts, if any, resulting from its provision.
Data were primarily generated through one-to-one semi-structured interviews,
each lasting 20–75min. Typical questions included: how did you hear about
the personality disorder service? What are your experiences of prison treat-
ment? What do you hope to achieve from treatment? Were you concerned that
you would not be admitted?
The respondents comprised two groups: patients transferred from prison to
hospital for treatment under section 47 of the MHA 1983 (n= 11) and
members of the multidisciplinary treatment team (senior and low-grade nurses,
occupational therapists, psychiatrists and psychologists: n= 12). Interview data
were veriﬁed (triangulated), and supplemented, following systematic and
detailed analysis of patients’ medical records (34 folders in all).
Consistent with the ward’s admissions’ policy, all patient respondents were
male. The average age of patients was approximately 33 years (the youngest
patient being 23 and the oldest 43 years old). All identiﬁed as being white
British. Diagnostically, patients presented with signiﬁcant comorbidity: many
had multiple personality disorders in addition to ASPD (mainly avoidant and
borderline types), history of substance misuse, depressive disorders and/or
psychopathy. Interestingly, 10 of the 12 patients had been sentenced to an IPP
prior to their admission; the remainder had received automatic life sentences
for murder.
All respondents were fully informed of the purpose of the research.
Consent was a prerequisite to participation and subsequent use of anonymised
data. Participants were duly informed of their right to withdraw from the study
at any time, without prejudice to their legal rights or treatment plan; however,
it remains possible that patients might have felt obliged to participate in order
to present to their carers the image of pro-social behaviour. Following review,
the study’s working method was approved by an NHS ethics committee and
the researcher’s academic institution. Subsequent consideration was given to
increasing the formal sample size by way of ‘substantial amendment’ – that is,
one likely to affect the ‘scientiﬁc value of the study’ to a ‘signiﬁcant degree’
(National Research Ethics Service, 2012). But, with clear evidence of data sat-
uration, this was deemed to be unnecessary and, therefore, unethical. A more
substantial charge might be that the single-site character of the study limits the
generalisability of its ﬁndings (Melzer, Tom, Brugha, & Fryers, 2004). For
example, it is appreciated that patients may have been apprised of the inter-
view questions prior to offering their consent to participate. However, this
argument must fail because multisite research merely perpetuates this standard
limitation of qualitative research. It must also fail because, on ﬁnal analysis of
a working method, data will ‘speak for itself’ (Liebling, 2001). Moderatum
generalisations remain, more than anything else, the product of ‘a broader set
of recognizable [theoretical] features’ (Williams, 2000, p. 215).
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Theoretical orientations and study questions
The study adopted a constructionist ontological and an interpretivist epistemo-
logical approach to data collection. Data were analysed by reference to work
of Michel Foucault on governmentality, which continues to be very inﬂuential
among those examining the link between increasingly pessimistic modes of
crime control (such as punitive sentencing) and loss of faith in the capacity of
psychiatric experts to reform offenders (Garland, 1995, 2001; Giddens, 1990).
His main contribution to this ﬁeld is his examination of the relationship
between the growth of psychiatry in the nineteenth century and the deploying
of treatment linked to the desire for improved social welfare. He argues that,
since the early 1800s, antisocial members of society – the madman (1965), the
sexually depraved (1981) and the delinquent (1979) – have all been offered up
to increasingly sophisticated forms of psychiatric treatment in penal and psy-
chiatric (disciplinary) institutions. The ultimate goal of the psychiatric practitio-
ners who administer treatment is to reintegrate antisocial individuals into
society with a pro-social outlook. Rehabilitation occurs, he posits, because the
normative content of psychiatric treatment is capable of effecting changes in
self-understanding over time. To increase the chances of rehabilitation, psychi-
atric practitioners implement disciplinary techniques aimed at enhancing the
normative effectiveness of treatment within the institution. Such measures
include systems of reward and punishment, the ranking of subjects in order of
their responsiveness to treatment norms and constant surveillance.
In his early work, Foucault stops short of claiming that psychiatric treat-
ment is always effective at eliminating antisocial tendencies or criminal behav-
iour, for antisocial individuals seldom believe they ought to change. The
adaptive state response is to make offender-responsibilisation programmes an
essential component of risk-centred policy (Garland, 2001; O’Malley, 1992,
2000; Rose, 2000). The IPP, for instance, is a prime example of what Reich-
man has termed ‘an insurance concept of crime control’ (1986, p. 153), for it
both facilitates ‘responsible’ offenders who are treatment seeking (resources
permitting) and excludes from society, through incapacitative restraint,
‘irresponsible’ offenders who do not insure society against the risks they pose.
However, Foucault later questions whether rehabilitative and anti-rehabilita-
tive sentiments held by antisocial individuals dictate whether the achievement of
new self-understanding is possible through punishment correction. Rather, he
contends that responsibilisation techniques are capable of inducing behavioural
change because antisocial individuals may be unaware that norms are taking
hold (Foucault, 1981). What this means is that psychiatric treatments are
informed by risk concepts that ‘construct particular norms of behaviour which
are used to encourage individuals to engage voluntarily in self-regulation in
response to these norms’ (Lupton, 1999, p. 25, emphasis supplied).
The problem for the researcher is to evaluate the meaning of
‘voluntariness’ in circumstances where offenders are being coerced into
The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 53
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receiving treatment. For responsibilisation is predicated on individuals being
able to exercise agency and form concrete strategies about how they and
others should act (Nealon, 2008). Whilst strategies between individuals can be
mutually beneﬁcial (e.g. the professional’s giving of treatment; the offender’s
efforts to become more pro-social), they can equally be calculated to gain
‘advantage over’ others (Foucault, 1982). Consider:
Might the offender with ASPD in receipt of hospital treatment claim to be
pro-social in order to gain ‘advantage over’ their custodians?
The background information in this example of strategy would, presumably, be
that the antisocial offender has sought access to hospital treatment for reasons
unrelated to the pursuit of pro-social outlook. Foucault would ground this
possibility in discussion of the ‘confessional’: a shorthand for the process of
pre-admission assessment, during which one is obliged to confesses ‘one’s
crimes, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires’ before normalising techniques
(such as psychiatric treatment) are made available by the professional (1981,
p. 59). Upon gaining admission, the treatment-seeking offender must then seek
to counter his ‘systemic deprivation’ by purchasing freedom through coopera-
tion and engagement (Foucault, 2006, p. 156). An example of the potential
psychodrama this can lead to is captured by Peay (1989), in her qualitative
study of the circumstances of patient discharge from Special Hospitals where
they detained under the MHA 1983. Among her many ﬁndings, she showed
that patients who did not desire, or believe they needed, psychiatric medica-
tions, nevertheless took them. One patient explained: ‘medication is my ticket
out of here’ (p. 52).
Whilst the administration of medication in coercive circumstances is unli-
kely to completely undermine therapeutic efﬁcacy, the usefulness of psycholog-
ical therapies will be in large part determined by the patient’s reasons for
offering his cooperation. If, as above, the patient engages for strategic reasons,
an important question is raised about the extent to which treatment reliant on
self-responsibilisation techniques can ever be effective in coercive
circumstances. In Foucauldian speak: can the resistive and docile qualities of
the antisocial individual be harnessed in any meaningful through psychiatric
treatment? The following ‘partial’ hypothesis is proposed:
Patients with ASPD do not self-govern in accordance with psychiatric norms;
rather, they present the image of pro-social behaviour in order to achieve expe-
dited parole.
One inevitable challenge of employing a Foucauldian lens to test this hypothesis
is the need to show that patient cooperation, if present at all, is due to his
pursuit of ulterior motives rather than exposure to treatment norms inducing pro-
social behaviour (Luke, 2005; Nealon, 2008). To address this methodological
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requirement, assertions made in respect of the data were submitted to a working
burden of proof (balance of probabilities). So, for instance, if on the balance of
probabilities, the evidence suggested that the presentation of pro-social behav-
iours was mediated by legal coercive pressures, a case could, or should, be made
for the normative ineffectiveness of treatment on offenders with ASPD. Only by
adopting this rigorous burden of proof could the data remain sensitive to the
more general, underlying question: ‘To what principles does the individual refer
in order to moderate, limit, regulate [his] activity?’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 53). The
remainder of this paper addresses this murky question.
Rehabilitation amid resistance?
The regime from which the data are taken is a typical example of a disciplin-
ary institution. From the moment the patient arrives on the ward, and for the
duration of his two years’ stay, he experiences a ‘meticulous assumption of
responsibility’ for his time and body (1979b, p. 130). This process begins each
morning at 7.50 am, when he is expected to ‘negotiate’ with a member of the
multidisciplinary team, the activities he will pursue that day (oversleeping is
recorded as a ‘refusal’). Negotiated activities range from group therapy ses-
sions to ‘privileged’ activities, such as escorted leave, exercise in the gym and
playing on the ward computer console, to commonplace activities, like eating
in the canteen, getting a haircut, taking prescribed medication and setting a
time for homework.
If he carries out his routine activities in the annular communal area, secu-
rity staff, health support workers and nurses keep watch from their ‘panoptic’
ofﬁce. If he enters one of the dimly lit corridors, where they cannot see, static
cameras record and report his behaviour. If he is seen transgressing the rules,
an ‘incident’ is logged in one of the many medical ﬁles. During the subsequent
progress review meeting, he will be expected to explain his difﬁculties follow-
ing rules; and, if the transgression was signiﬁcant, decisions may be reached
about the status of any privileges previously enjoyed. For more serious or per-
sistent rule breaking, he risks being readmitted to prison, for a ‘period of
reﬂection’ (with the opportunity of readmission if he is remorseful). Usually,
however, this disruptive measure is reserved for rare instances of treatment
refusal unresolved by moderate forms of surveillance-coercion. The most effec-
tive, and impressive, of these is peer pressure:
In order to get the best out of that course, they have to participate. We can talk
to them ﬁrst: we can ask them what the problem is, what’s going on … And
better than that, their peers wouldn’t let them get away with [that]. They would
actually be the ﬁrst to challenge them … (Nurse)
For instance, Mr H began refusing food in protest over his loss of privileges
12 months into treatment, only to be heard crunching sweets during a group
meeting. His peers responded with an ultimatum:
The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 55
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 06
:07
 17
 A
pr
il 2
01
3 
Challenged by patients when he informed them he was ok and yet his
expressions said otherwise. It was suggested to him by his peers that if he didn’t
want to be at the meeting maybe he should leave. (Ward Round Notes)
Mr H chose not to leave the meeting, because he feared ‘he would lose his nego-
tiations’ (Ward Round Notes). In so doing, he demonstrated the self-referential
behaviours expected of those with ASPD. What is, therefore, fascinating about
this exchange is not so much the effectiveness of peer pressure in securing Mr
H’s compliance as the phenomenon of patient solidarity itself. In a world where
the lowest common denominator is patient resistance, how do we explain the
collective reaction to Mr H? Two potential explanations are proposed.
First, the collective condemnation of Mr H’s resistive treatment behaviour
was a coextensive strategy used by patients to evidence their commitment to
pro-social norms. Patients may (rightly) equate good behaviour with the long-
term goal of achievement of expedited parole. Short-term derivative goals
might also be lost without solidarity. For example:
[O]n this ward, if someone is upset, and is distressed, is angry, hostile, aggressive,
and refuses to go through to the dining room … if someone refuses to do that, then
no–one goes … That would be happening quite a lot if we didn’t have an effective
way of dealing with that, and the most effective way is peer pressure. (Nurse)
The second explanation, which runs counter to the author’s working hypothe-
sis, is that the phenomenon of peer pressure is evidence of the efﬁcacy of the
highly structured ‘disciplinary’ regime at inculcating antisocial personalities
with treatment and processional norms over time.
The ﬁrst explanation is attentive to the possibility that legal coercive pres-
sures (external motivation) may encourage patients’ health-seeking behaviour;
it requires us to compare the ‘quality’ of the patient’s engagement with treat-
ment in prison (if treatment was received) with the hospital ward. What we
should expect to ﬁnd is evidence of external motivation at the point of admis-
sion to hospital and, because of the underlying resistance to the idea of rehabil-
itation, no great difference in the quality of engagement in the respective
institutions. Crucially, what we actually ﬁnd is evidence of external motivation
to seek treatment and differences in the quality of engagement between prison
and the ward:
When they brought in this IPP system, in theory it’s fantastic. I don’t knock the
prison system at all, I don’t knock the sentences. At the end of the day, I did
wrong and they were doing their job. But with the IPP, they’re giving them out
willy-nilly. (Mr H)
[In hospital], you get on courses, boom, straight away. But in prison, there’s a
big waiting list, you can wait years and years to get on courses … To be honest,
I thought I’ll just give it a shot, and see what’s what. (Mr B)
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[Y]ou go to the treatment group [in prison] and all you’re doing is ticking the
box … You do work but you throw it away. You don’t put anything into practice
or remember it. (Mr K)
I don’t think I would learn anything [in prison] because nobody wants to learn,
everyone wants to tick the boxes for their parole hearing. At least here I’m doing
something useful. Everyone here wants to learn. They’re not ticking the boxes.
We feel as a patient group that if someone comes along just ticking boxes then
they get challenged not by the staff but by the patient group. The patient group
literally have a meeting at 9am. Those meetings are there, say, you were a patient
and you were messing about in groups and you weren’t bringing anything to it
and you were being a distraction on the ward, you would be challenged and
they’d want to know the reason why. (Mr H)
If we accept Mr H’s account of treatment response in hospital, it follows that
his prior resistance (refusal to eat; sweet crunching) has been overcome by
internal motivation to address his offending behaviour at some point. It also
follows that the prison regime must lack the essential ingredients to effect pro-
social changes in the self-governance of inmates (including Mr H). One possi-
ble reason is negative interpersonal relations. Sykes, for example, states that
one manifestation of the ‘cohesive inmate society’ is that ‘inmates’ will habitu-
ally deny the ‘custodians’ ‘power to strip [him] of his ability to control him-
self’ (1958, p. 107). Those who do more than superﬁcially engage in prison
treatment, risk doing violence to the code of inmate solidarity – if not their
own personal safety (‘I couldn’t ask the prison ofﬁcer for help. You couldn’t
be seen as weak. In that environment, it’s them and us’ (Mr L)). For this rea-
son, the prison regime cannot, as Foucault would say, ‘bend behaviour towards
a terminal state’ through ‘repetitive’ and ‘graduated’ treatment (1979b, p. 161).
Another, less obvious, limitation is the relative absence of psychiatrists to
deploy, or oversee the deployment of, cognitive-behavioural treatment in
prison. Yet, this is relevant because psychiatry is an eclectic discourse whose
treatment rationality derives as much from the original biochemical model of
mental disorder as the psychosocial model provided by psychology. A conse-
quence is that cognitive-behavioural therapies, though not necessarily delivered
by psychiatrists in prison (or elsewhere), may require for their legitimacy, and
so, their normalising potential, the presence of the behavioural science which
has the right to deﬁne the medico-legal problem (Foucault, 1972).
Since forensic psychiatric hospitals do not face these limitations, the sug-
gested improvements in internal motivation following a period of treatment
causes the ﬁrst explanation (patients are really externally motivated) to con-
verge with the second (motivation is a result of the internalisation of treatment
norms over time, allowing for occasional petty resistance). This account was
preferred by several members of the multidisciplinary team:
[F]or some people you get more of a sense they don’t really want to change, but
are pursuing an avenue as a means to an end … albeit, part way through that
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process, they might have some enlightenment and decide it’s worth changing.
(Psychologist)
[P]eople who aren’t particularly motivated at the beginning have a sense, you
know, I get what this is about and I want to do it properly. (Psychiatrist)
I suppose, ultimately, gaining parole is one of the main motivating factors for a
lot of the guys on the ward. And you can often ﬁnd once you get somebody into
more of a therapeutic environment, their gaining parole is the end point, but they
actually perhaps see there’s a process in between, which they can beneﬁt from.
(Occupational Therapist)
But, are these statements innocent of the potential of patients to ‘fake’ rehabilita-
tion? Does psychiatric treatment (talking therapies) result in patients with ASPD
adopting pro-social behaviours due to internal motivation? Mr C argues not:
As soon as you get into groups and start talking with the nurses, it’s like every-
one puts a front on. You know, I have seen that when the [psychiatrists] come
into certain meetings, as soon as, if [Psychiatrist] comes in, certain patients will
start talking differently. I think to myself: if I can see this, surely they can. I do
think they get sucked in. I can predict what they’re gonna say. They’ll say
they’ve put this skill into practice, when I know they haven’t.
Other patients who were asked – towards the end of the interview process – if it
was possible to ‘fake rehabilitation’ were unequivocally dismissive. Mr K, for
instance, argues: ‘You can’t just go in [to treatment sessions] and tick a box.
You’ve got to show motivation and a certain degree of work. It gets looked at’.
Mr E implicitly agrees, pointing out that: ‘Everything’s analysed inside out’.
Later, he states: ‘When I ﬁrst came here I was quite cold and callous. I wasn’t
really very pleasant to be around. But, you know, I’ve changed a lot’.
During the study, patient medical records proved a valuable tool for
cross-referencing patient self-assessments with a variety of clinical data and
anecdotal accounts of patient responsiveness to treatment. In the case of Mr E,
there is indeed evidence of positive change:
… despite provocation [Mr E] chose not to become involved in [the altercation
with another patient]. This should be seen in a positive light as an indication of
his expressed motivation.
However, elsewhere in his medical records, a ward round note describes an
incident in which he was one of the two patients who took an ‘active dislike’
to one another, each retaliating by ‘saying the other was not committed to
treatment; was putting a front on’. As well as demonstrating the continued
importance of parole-seeking behaviour in explaining patient engagement, it
also shows us that patient solidarity towards this mutually desired goal is
subject to rupture, because of the ‘multiple forms of individual disparity, of
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objectives’ that actors within power relations may have from time to time
(1982, p. 224). In Mr C’s case, the objective in dismissing the truth of his
peers’ pro-social behaviour during therapy was to assert that he was being
unfairly held up to a higher standard of behaviour by his peers than they were
themselves achieving: ‘[They’ll] ﬁnd a way of trying to say [my behaviour is
manipulative], and when I try and explain it’s not, they say, you’re just trying
to justify it’s not … More probably with the patients’. Necessarily, taking him-
self outside the scope of patient solidarity, he can only protest: ‘I can’t work
this place out’. By comparison, in the case of Mr E and his protagonist, the
strategic aim was, in Foucault’s words, to ‘deprive the opponent of his means
of combat and to reduce him to giving up the struggle’ (1982, p. 225). And,
although it is counterintuitive that Messrs C and E would engage in petty
struggles that could undermine their respective chances of achieving parole, it
is likely to be a consequence of their comorbid diagnoses of psychopathy – a
diagnosis associated with cognitive dissonance. Cleckley writes:
Despite his excellent rational powers, the psychopath continues to show the most
execrable judgment about attaining what one might presume to be his ends. He
throws away excellent opportunities to … be dismissed from hospital, or to gain
other ends that he has sometimes spent considerable effort towards gaining …
This exercise of execrable judgment is not particularly modiﬁed by experience,
however chastening his experiences may be. (1976, p. 345)
A further form of strategy offering an analytical lens through which to argue
for the absence of internal motivation among patients on the ward is described
by Foucault as ‘the manner in which a partner in a certain game acts with
regard to what he thinks should be the actions of the others and what he con-
siders the others think to be his own’ (1984, p. 225). What he means by this is
that one actor in the power relation will endeavour to direct the ‘other’ by pre-
empting their expectations and acting accordingly. For example, the patient
may anticipate (not unreasonably) that the interviewer has negative preconcep-
tions about the manipulative disposition of those with ASPD (and the diagnos-
tically less popular psychopathy), but rely on this to his advantage. Mr D
states:
I ﬁnd that, because of the stigma attached to [personality disorders], things are
probably analysed too much, and it can sometimes end up confusing you. And,
actually, it’s face value … Straight away, there’s an angle … I have to take
responsibility for that. People are going to question my motives, but I’m at the
point now where I don’t feel I do do that. I ﬁnd it quite insulting. But at the end
of the day, I’m in hospital and I have to put up with that.
His response:
[A] lot of us here still have the mentality that you’re here for your parole; you’re
not here to change your life; you’re here to fulﬁl the criteria [they] set for you,
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and that’s the big divide. And a lot of patients here are not in that mentality,
they’re here, not because they want to change themselves; they want to change
other people. The people who are going out there and being successful, which
has [sic] not been many, have changed because they’ve had enough in their life
and they wanna change. You can’t come here with the mentality with, I’m gonna
change because I really want parole, I’m gonna tick all the boxes, which is the
kind of mentality that’s in prison. In here, you have to show that you’re using
your skills; you have to do it for your own beneﬁt, not for everybody else.
By impliedly allying himself with those purporting to be internally motivated,
Mr D may provide a further illustration of the scope of coextensive strategy
between patients linked to the desire for parole. In support, a nurse subse-
quently selects Mr D to demonstrate her scepticism of the general truth of
patient self-reports on the issue of rehabilitation:
[Mr D], for example, he’s been here for quite some time, excellent paper work,
problem solving, done [sic] all the groups, getting along quite well in the meet-
ings and stuff like that … [H]e couldn’t assimilate it. He ended up going back to
prison [for a ‘period of reﬂection’], and we had him back. You know, and you
just think to yourself: Is he taking it all on board this time? He appears to be.
But does he just behave in the way that, you know, he thinks we want him to
behave? Does he say the things that we want him to say?
The empirical data in this paper suggests this possibility. Patients with ASPD
(and psychopathy) would appear to engage with treatment as part of coexten-
sive strategy, which, although prone to occasional recapitulation, is attentive to
the potential for earlier release (external motivation). Consequently, practitio-
ners are justiﬁed in expressing reserve over the apparent effects of treatment.
The NICE guidelines rightly state:
A key issue in the treatment of [ASPD] and psychopathy is the test of therapeutic
outcome: how will the practitioners know if the treatment has been successful?
The remainder of this paper responds to this question. It then goes on to discuss
how treatment success might be promoted in the forensic psychiatric system.
‘Key performance indicators’ as treatment success
Treatment success in forensic psychiatric practice is usually evaluated by refer-
ence to rates of patient reoffending. Available empirical evidence indicates
these to be high (McCarthy & Duggan, 2010). Whilst this should undermine
public support in psychiatric discourse, the logic of government dictates that
the mere promise to isolate and normalise mentally disordered subjects ensures
its viability (Foucault, 1979a, p. 272). Ultimately, however, in the absence of
veriﬁable treatment success, this effect of power runs counter to the best
interests of professionals:
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[Y]ou kind of get a bit despondent and wonder: why am I doing this? But then
people say, you know, it’s little changes. Maybe it’s their self-esteem that’s
improved … If you measure every little bit of change that’s important to them, it
makes it easier not to feel quite so disappointed. (Nurse)
Foucault argues that the task facing us all is to imagine the ‘political “double
bind”’ individualising us within ‘the totalization of modern power structures’,
and subvert it (1982, p. 216). For patients, this means resisting the imposition
of pro-social treatment norms (an act which it has been shown they embrace).
For professionals, resistance means recognising that ‘[p]rotection of the public
should be the welcome by-product of improved clinical care, not the goal of
such management’ (Mullen, 2002, p. 229, emphasis supplied). This entails that
improved clinical care should service both the reasons for patient engagement
with treatment (achieving paroleor, more generally, to improve the quality of
their lives) and alleviate the professional pressures exerted by modern power
structures (governmentality). One possible means of achieving this – which
was alluded to by the nurse above – is to focus on what McCarthy and
Duggan call ‘key performance indicators’, or:
Changes in psycho-social functioning (e.g. educational attainment, employment,
independent living), and outcomes which focus on the perceptions and experi-
ences of service users (e.g. perceived levels of distress/safety, quality of life) may
help clinicians to assess the efﬁcacy of treatment programmes beyond the pres-
ence of offending behaviour and is an issue the authors will address in future
work with this forensic population. (2010, p. 125)
Key performance indicators achieved by patients during the study included less
severe and frequent episodes of self-harm; lower levels of learned helplessness
linked to incapacitation in prison; completion of educational qualiﬁcations; and
independent living. Mr K, a particularly ‘successful’ patient, had completed
numerous college courses (which he described as ‘enjoyable’), and was at the
time of his interview living in a hostel three days per week. He reﬂects on his
progression thus:
I couldn’t sit and talk to you now and look you in the face. I couldn’t communi-
cate. I just didn’t do very well … [T]his place has offered me a lot. The harder I
work, the harder they put the effort into try and achieve what we want to
achieve, which is for me to get released …
The probability that patients will, like Mr K, seek to achieve key performance
indicators to improve their chances of parole is a potential concern. Mr C, for
instance, states: ‘I’d like to go straight out and live with at my dad’s or my
mum’s or something, but I’ll go wherever gets me parole’. McCarthy and Dug-
gan (2010) seek to mitigate the consequences of hollow engagement by urging
us to evaluate the practical signiﬁcance of key performance indicators by refer-
ence to a wider evaluation of ‘the quality of patient engagement during speciﬁc
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components of treatment’. Their (implied) rationale is that enhanced emotional
stability resulting from external motivation (legal coercion), rather than internal
motivation (an honest desire for alternative self-understanding), might merely
create ‘a more successful criminal’ (Psychiatrist) – that is one who is more
able to commit crimes without detection.
The problem with this analysis is that it presupposes three contingent
propositions, each of which undermines the very notion of patient treatability.
First, we are told that the difference between the successful and unsuccessful
criminal is his underlying emotional stability. Second, it follows that it is
immaterial whether enhanced emotional stability is mediated by internal or
external treatment motivation: the will-to- recidivate will remain. And, third,
key performance indicators actually increase the chances of antisocial conduct,
because they may improve the patient’s chances of parole, but have no material
impact on the quality of treatment engagement.
The better view is that key performance indicators can, in conjunction with
treatment, improve recidivism, irrespective of the quality of his engagement. The
reason is that the achievement of key performance indicators is in patients’ best
interests. In the short term, their achievement directly improves the patients’
conditions of detention. In the medium term, their achievement provides better
evidence of suitability for parole than is available in prison. In the long term,
upon gaining parole, and having achieved key performance indicators (such as
feasible independent living), the patient may believe it to be in his best interests
to continue to implement cognitive behavioural skills in public in order to ensure
retention of current (psychosocial) beneﬁts. The practical result is that the patient
is encouraged, as Foucault would say, to ‘regulate the cycle of repetition’ of
pro-social behaviour on himself (1979b, p. 149). Consider the analogous,
idealised example of the schoolchild in the ‘disciplinary’ school:
A schoolchild who is forbidden from using her pen in her left hand (as was once
often the case) may cooperate with her teacher’s instruction to change hands for
fear of reprisal. When ‘training’ ceases, she might continue to exercise the skill
of using the right hand to pen or may dismiss it at the earliest convenience.
Equally, the semi-ambidextrous child may call upon the new skill accidentally,
whimsically or, better, sel-servingly over a period of time. Each time the skill is
repeated, convergence between ‘training’ and performance is reinforced.
Of course, in this example, only the acquisition of a ﬁne motor skill is in the
balance; where changes in personality are hoped for, creating the conditions
for the repetition of desirable behaviour is undoubtedly more precarious. It is
submitted that a crucial element is that patients achieve parole from hospital.
Parole from hospital: a coextensive strategy
The usual route into the community for the IPP patient who has completed
treatment, but whose tariff has not yet expired, is to return to prison. Upon its
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expiry, the patient becomes eligible for a parole hearing; if he is successful, he
is released on life licence. If, on the other hand, his earliest date of release
arrives during his stay in hospital, he is entitled to apply to the First-tier Tribu-
nal (Mental Health). Since the patient will, in all probability, require the con-
sent of the Secretary of State before he is discharged (‘restriction direction’:
section 49 of the MHA 1983), the Tribunal may not order discharge. Rather,
the Tribunal may recommend that the patient would be entitled to absolute or
conditional discharge were he not subject to the ‘restriction direction’. If this is
the recommendation of the Tribunal, the patient will remain in hospital. A par-
ole board hearing will then take place in prison in the ordinary way.
Between these two possibilities, prison and hospital, patients unanimously
felt that it was in their best interests to achieve parole from hospital. One rea-
son is that parole hearings for prisoners are scarce, and this inevitably results
in protracted detention. Another reason was the legal requirement that a patient
discharged from hospital receive an aftercare plan under section 117 of the
MHA 1983; the result of which, taking into account the considerable discretion
of the relevant Primary Care Trust or Health Authority, should include the pro-
vision of community psychiatric nurses, social security beneﬁts, support with
employment and housing. This was said to compare favourably to prison,
where ‘[they] give you a little bit of wad, and they just expect you to go on
your own and stay out of trouble’ (Mr H).
The multidisciplinary team also favoured patients being paroled from hos-
pital. In working alongside community services, it was argued there would be
more scope to ‘help [patients] manage crises more effectively …’ (Psychia-
trist). Furthermore, parole from hospital would ensure better continuity of
employment and educational arrangements, which, like the provision of hous-
ing and social security beneﬁts, are in the nature of key performance indicators
linked to independent living and repetition of pro-social skills. All members of
the multidisciplinary team were, therefore, disappointed that no patient serving
an indeterminate sentence had achieved parole through the mental health route.
At the time of the study, Mr K had received a favourable response from a
First-tier Tribunal (Mental health), but a parole hearing was proving elusive.
Such delays led one Psychiatrist to note that facilitating patients in their
attempts to achieve parole from hospital would require ‘unconscionable
amounts of money’. Indeed, one patient was subsequently transferred to
another hospital, against his wishes, to avoid bed-blocking. Other patients,
disenfranchised by the limits of the care pathway, had historically returned to
prison of their own volition before treatment was complete. Mr C notes:
[They] lose motivation some people, because they get towards the end [of treat-
ment] and they don’t see that parole’s gonna happen, so they think I’m just gon-
na go back to where I started from … If [Mr K] gets turned down, we’re gonna
think: well, so we’re gonna go back, may as well go back now instead of wasting
energy here …
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One related limitation of the pathway was that behavioural courses on the ward
were not recognised by the Ministry of Justice. Patients who submitted to the
demanding regime did so in blind faith that the Parole Board would deem
treatment in hospital and prison to be therapeutically equable:
[B]ecause [treatment is] not recognised, some people do see it as a waste of time.
But it’s not really; you wouldn’t be getting on the courses anyway … There’s a
chance. You have to start somewhere and work your way through. (Mr E)
It has been suggested that a patient who is either sent back to prison, or
‘chooses’ to return, is most unlikely to self-regulate in pro-social ways (Rick-
ford & Edgar, 2009). This is because his return to prison will cause a break-
down in several self-governmental factors, namely: ‘loss of faith in the
possibility of change’; ‘sense of personal failure’; ‘sense of betrayal and exclu-
sion’; and ‘undermining self-efﬁcacy in previously existing coping strategies’
(Jones, 2002).
To put these factors into context: ‘loss of faith’ relates to the patient’s dis-
belief that the mental health system has the procedural tools in place to offer
parole. Sense of ‘betrayal and exclusion’ is a response to the failure of the sys-
tem to deliver parole following engagement. The sense of ‘personal failure’ is
indicative of the patient’s failed attempt to improve the conditions of his life.
And, ﬁnally, the disjunct between the patient’s responsible behaviour and the
custodians’ response to him may undermine ‘self-efﬁcacy’. Mr L illustrates this
point well:
My ﬁrst week here, I don’t know, it was overpowering in many ways. I started
helping someone painting the wall, and I started to become conscious, there’s so
much security in prison, coming here, right, [Mr L], here’s your tools. I’m think-
ing, what’s this fucking place about. But it’s good. I was realising the responsibil-
ity I had.
Consider that highly volatile patients like Mr L, who are removed from the
treatment regime against their wishes, have fewer chances to receive the plau-
dits (or rewards) that result from being perceived as productive, responsible
and self-efﬁcacious (the patient as ‘painter and decorator’; the ‘educated’
patient, and so forth). Consequent upon the disavowal of key performance
indicators and the inability of the patient to determine his future, he is likely to
feel ‘confused, lacking in conﬁdence, or worthless’ (McMurran & Theodosi,
2007). The behavioural consequence is that he is primed for what Foucault
refers to as an ‘after the event reaction’ (1982, p. 225).
For example, prior to his admission to the personality disorder ward, Mr L
was transferred from a category B prison to a therapeutic community for treat-
ment. Four months into the programme, he was discharged back to HMP Not-
tingham, because his high PCL-R suggested to staff that he would beneﬁt from
treatment if it was administered in a highly structured regime. Powerless to
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inﬂuence the decision of his custodians, his ‘after the event’ reaction was to
threaten suicide and instigate a large-scale prison riot. The fact that he subse-
quently denied having taken part in that riot is further evidence of his shift to
violent, anti-authoritarian forms of self-efﬁcacy, consequent upon a breakdown
in positive self-governance factors. Exposed to the perpetual threat of fellow
prisoners (I was always living in fear. You didn’t know what was coming and
when), antisocial behaviour was destined to become the principal of his
personal safety.
By comparison, upon his admission to the personality disorder ward, he
was re-exposed to a zero tolerance policy on aggression, and patient adherence
to it. What is interesting is that the multidisciplinary team often assumes that
the responsiveness of patients to this rule is part evidence of the potential of
treatment to rehabilitate antisocial personalities outside prison. But, for
antisocial personalities like Mr L, compliance with the rule is a strategy aimed
at avoiding adverse outcomes related to their decision frame to engage:
[H]ere, if you got into an incident with someone, you get aggressive, that other
person thinks in their head, I can’t react to this [because I’ll be sent back to
prison], so they don’t, so that isn’t gonna fuel me anymore. (Mr C)
This reminds us that in a system aiming to rehabilitate, ‘resistance comes ﬁrst’
(Deleuze, 2006, p. 74). It also serves to warn us that the primary success of
the reformist agenda, whether evidenced in the psychiatric hospital or the
prison, lies in its ability to assimilate ‘the transgression of the laws in a general
tactic of subjection’ (Foucault, 1979b, p. 272). But, does this means that
antisocial personalities are beyond rehabilitation?
The aim of this paper has been to respond optimistically to this vexed
question. Drawing on empirical evidence, it was broadly proposed that legal
coercion (external motivation) and the achievement of key performance indica-
tors can improve treatment outcomes, provided patients are given the opportu-
nity of parole from hospital. If this ‘mental health pathway’ approach were
adopted, it would offer an ideal type solution to reducing high reoffending
rates, without needing to refer to the postmodern Foucauldian ﬁction that psy-
chiatric treatment imposes rehabilitation effects. Instead, custodians could speak
without cynicism about the ways in which resistive patients actively seek to
impress upon them this possibility. As Foucault himself once observed:
[B]eggars, poor folks, or simply the mediocre … appear in a strange theatre
where they assume poses, declamations, grandiloquences, where they dress up in
bits of drapery which are necessary if they want to be paid attention to on the
stage of power. (1979a, p. 88)
On this stage of power, it is plausible that the actors may one day act and
speak without equivocation. However, under the spotlight’s glare, the
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well-versed ‘beggars’ and ‘poor folk’ are likely to be motivated only by the
prospect of spare change. And so, whilst we do not deny those who treat
antisocial personalities the possibility of rehabilitation, we remind them that
there are those who are particularly adept at learning their lines, in order to
improvise their parts.
Conclusion
The antisocial personality is solely motivated by self-interest. To achieve his
desired ends, he ‘actively intrudes upon and violates the rights of others, as
well as transgresses established social codes through deceitful or illegal behav-
iours’ (Millon & Davis, 1996, p. 444). Whilst the result is often harmful to
others, the absence of ‘painful or egodystonic’ symptoms means that it is illog-
ical for him to engage in treatment to address his interpersonal exploitativeness
(Reid & Gacono, 2000). When he is convicted of a violent crime, we are,
therefore, faced with a difﬁcult choice: treatment or incapacitation? After April
2005, the antisocial personality who commits a dangerous crime is faced with
the same ‘choice’. One effect of the IPP, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003,
is he is unlikely to be paroled unless he engages with treatment in prison. If
he is subsequently diagnosed with ASPD and is ‘treatment seeking’ (NICE,
2010), he may be offered hospital treatment. The available statistics reveal that
those with ASPD are the most likely group to consent to treatment in hospital
(MHAC, 2008).
The aim of this study was to explore this counterintuitive phenomenon,
and to examine if hospital treatment results in changes in the patient’s self-
understanding. It was argued that treatment-seeking behaviour in hospital
would be predicted by scarce prison resources, linked to proliﬁc use of the
indeterminate sentence. It was hypothesised that patients would present the
image of pro-social behaviour in order to improve their chances of securing
parole (external motivation). What was found (on the balance of probabilities)
was that patients’ strategic poise also extends to pre-emptive tactics used to
dispossess others of this negative preconception. For example:
My motivation … it starts off by ‘oh, I want to get parole, and I want to get
out’, and all the rest of it, then, you come here and you get into the programme
and it changes to the motivation of changing your life. It’s a personal journey,
you know. You come to understand that the person you are can’t survive outside
… (Mr K)
Rather than cite this as evidence of untreatability, it was shown that external
motivation (legal coercion) is an important prerequisite to exposing the patient
to what might be an effective ‘treatment dose’ over time. It was then con-
cluded that readmitting the patient to prison, either on treatment completion or
at his behest (because he has become disillusioned that treatment will lead to
parole), undermines this process for two reasons. First, if the patient is returned
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to prison, there is the potential for (violent) reaction deviance. Second, after-
care from hospital favours the consolidation of what is known as ‘key perfor-
mance indicators’: independent living, employment, educational achievements
and so forth (Hollin, 1995). These may incentivise the patient to act in pro-
social ways in the community to safeguard the beneﬁts accrued during hospital
treatment. Upon reaching a notional ‘treatment dose’, pro-social behaviour
may become self-regulating, thereby reducing the likelihood of reoffending.
However, this raises the important issue of temporal contingency: just how
long is long enough? That we do not, or cannot, know the answer to this ques-
tion belies the claim that there is now ‘a strong case for investing in rehabilita-
tion’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010, p. 4). For, although the rehabilitative intent of
the indeterminate sentence may seem modern, it is in fact no more than a
renewal of early 1990s government policy directed at improving the ‘quality of
life’ of inmates through delivery of structured programmes (HM Chief Inspec-
torate of Prison, 1993). Then, as now, the promise by behavioural sciences that
rehabilitation is possible justiﬁes the tacit assumption in government policy
that ‘on the soft ﬁbres of the [offender’s] brain is founded the unshakable base
of the soundest of Empires’ (Foucault, 1979b, p. 103). The problem is that the
goal of individualisation and totalisation only makes sense because of the con-
sistent refusal of the antisocial personality to accept the logic of bio-political
controls. Yet, this coextensivity is rarely discussed. For example:
Many prisoners were crying out for ‘rehabilitation’ and for ‘courses’. Some were
very positive about such courses and others were scathing, demanding a more
individualized approach to their offending behaviour. Most, however, seemed to
want to stop offending, and wanted ‘the prison’ to help them achieve this. This
appeared to us to represent both a genuine wish by many prisoners to change their
lives and ﬁnd new ways of thinking, as well as successful domination by ‘respon-
sibilization’ and self-governance penal strategies (which include enforced partici-
pation in ‘tackling offending behaviour’ programmes). (Liebling, 2004, p. 316)
By comparison, those who believe, like the current author, that the political
‘double bind’ is poor in form and sparing in methods will reason that legal
coercion better explains offenders’ will-to-engage in treatment. Actually,
producing behavioural change ﬁrst requires honest recognition of this.
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